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Abstract
We use the multi-sector and multi-country G-Cubed model to explore the potential 
role of three major shocks – to productivity, risk premia and US monetary 
policy – to explain the large movements in relative prices between 2002 and 2008. 
We ﬁ  nd that productivity shocks were major drivers of relative price movements, 
while shocks to risk premia and US monetary policy contributed temporarily to 
some of the relative price dispersions we observe in the data. The effect of US 
monetary policy shocks on relative prices was most pronounced in countries 
that ﬁ  x their currency to the US dollar. Those countries that ﬂ  oat were largely 
shielded from these effects. We conclude that the shocks we consider cannot 
fully capture the magnitude of the relative price movements over this period, 
suggesting that other driving forces could also be responsible, including those 
outside of the model.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation Numbers: E37, E52, E65
Keywords: productivity, relative prices, G-Cubed, risk premia, 
economic policyii
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1. Introduction
Between 2002 and 2008, the world experienced a very large shift in the prices 
of resources and commodities relative to other goods and services. For instance, 
between their trough in December 2003 and their peak in December 2008, resource 
export prices for Australia rose on average by 26 per cent annually in Australian 
dollar terms. Over the same period, prices for Australia’s manufactured, agricultural 
and service exports rose on average by 2.7, 6.2 and 3.5 per cent annually. The 
IMF indices for primary commodity prices also imply signiﬁ  cant relative price 
movements – relative to non-durable manufactured goods, energy prices almost 
tripled and agricultural prices rose by more than 50 per cent (Figures 1 and 2).
We explore the likely key drivers of these relative price movements by applying a 
range of shocks to the multi-sector, multi-country G-Cubed model. The goal is to 
improve our understanding of how major shocks are transmitted to inﬂ  ation and 
changes in relative prices in different economies. These shocks include stronger 
productivity growth, particularly in manufacturing in developing countries 
(especially China), and an investment boom due to a reduction in risk premia 
globally. We also explore the role that monetary policies, particularly in China 
and the United States, may have had in driving these movements in relative 
prices. We then combine the various shocks and explore whether they are able 
to explain the global experience between 2002 and 2008.2
Figure 1: Commodity, Manufacturing and Services Prices
US$, 2000 = 100
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; IMF; authors’ calculations
Figure 2: Prices Relative to Non-durable Manufactured Goods
2000 = 100







































2.  The Role of Developing Economies
During the 1990s and 2000s, much of east and south-east Asia experienced a 
prolonged period of strong economic growth spurred by growth in productivity. 
The adoption of production processes from more developed economies helped 
to boost productivity levels of the economies in this region, while growth in 
investment helped to boost labour productivity. According to the IMF, labour 
productivity in Asia grew on average by 3.3 per cent per year between 1970 and 
2005, of which capital accumulation contributed about 2 percentage points and 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth contributed 0.9 percentage points. Since 
1979, labour productivity in China has grown by around 6 per cent annually 
(Table 1). TFP growth is estimated to account for half this growth while capital 
accumulation accountsw for a signiﬁ  cant proportion. Estimates of average annual 
TFP growth in China’s manufacturing sector are as high as 10.5 per cent since 
1998.1
Table 1: Growth in Labour Productivity to 2005








Japan 1955 3.1 2.0 0.4 0.7
NIEs 1967 4.5 2.6 0.6 1.5
ASEAN-4 1973 2.8 1.6 0.9 0.0
China 1979 6.1 3.0 0.9 3.6
India 1982 2.7 1.4 0.8 1.7
Other Asia 1990 2.6 1.3 0.8 0.4
Notes: NIEs (newly industrialised economies) consists of Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan Province of China. ASEAN-4 consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
Source: IMF (2006)
While growth in productivity has had direct effects on relative prices, particularly 
on the goods that Asian economies export, the effects on relative prices have 
not solely been driven by supply-side factors. In particular, the increase in 
productivity sparked an investment boom in these economies, and economies 
that industrialise increase their demand for resources. Accordingly, the energy 
needs of Asia increased signiﬁ  cantly. China, which by 2007 accounted for about
7.5 per cent of global energy consumption, was responsible for nearly 50 per cent 
of the growth in global energy consumption between 2000 and 2007, while the 
1  For a range of estimates and a comparison with other countries, see Brandt, Van Biesebroeck 
and Zhang (2008).4
rest of the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region accounted for 18 per cent of growth in world energy 
consumption (see BP 2008). In comparison, North America was responsible for 
only 5 per cent of the growth in global energy consumption. The effect of the 
increased demand for resource commodities, as well as the downward pressure 
on prices for manufactured goods that Asia produces and exports, were major 
contributors to the large relative price movements.
Of course, changes in relative productivity levels, taxes and shifts in consumer 
preferences may also affect relative prices. However, the trends in relative prices, 
such as we have seen in the past decade, have also been driven by demand for 
certain goods from countries at earlier stages of their economic development. 
China and India have had the effect of increasing demand for certain commodities, 
especially energy and mineral products, while the prices of the products they 
export, for which they have a comparative advantage, have not risen by as much 
and in some cases have fallen.
3.  Monetary Policies Around the World
To some extent, the dramatic changes in relative prices could be the result of a 
combination of monetary policies adopted in the United States, China and elsewhere 
in the world. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the bursting of the
dot-com bubble and at the onset of the 2001–2002 recession, the Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) lowered interest rates aggressively, only gradually increasing rates 
as the US economy recovered (Figure 3). By ﬁ  xing its exchange rate to the
US dollar for a prolonged period of time after devaluing its currency in 1993
(Figure 4), China substantially reduced exchange rate risk for investors. 
The ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime adopted by China, combined with the large 
interest rate differential that resulted from China not adjusting its interest 
rates to the same extent as the United States, encouraged ﬁ  rms to borrow in 
US dollars to invest in China, receiving higher returns with little fear of a 
devaluation of the Chinese currency. This is evident in the rapid growth of 
the gross ﬂ  ow of foreign direct investment into China, from US$47 billion 
in 2001 to US$108 billion in 2008, driven mainly by ﬁ  rms domiciled in east 
Asia, particularly from Hong Kong (Figure 5). Also, China’s foreign exchange 
reserves grew exponentially – foreign reserves by July 2009 were about 
US$2.1 trillion, 10 times their level at the beginning of 2002 (Figure 4) – and 
gross ﬁ  xed capital formation as a share of GDP rose quite rapidly in China
(Figure 6). This boom in investment led directly to increased demand for raw 
materials and a large increase in commodity prices, particularly energy prices. 5
Even as China increased interest rates and used other tools to tighten monetary 
policy, such as increasing its reserve requirement ratio (Figure 7), investment 
remained high and foreign direct investment rose rapidly. While the increase 
in the reserve requirement ratio acted to restrict lending by banks in China 
(Figure 8), it did not stop ﬁ  rms reinvesting their proﬁ  ts nor did it slow the inﬂ  ow 
of foreign direct investment.
Figure 3: Monetary Policy Rates
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Figure 4: China – Exchange Rate Policy
Sources: CEIC; Thomson Reuters













































Figure 6: China – Investment Share
Per cent of GDP
Source: CEIC
Figure 7: China – Monetary Policy
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Figure 8: China – Credit and Money Supply
Year-ended percentage change
Source: CEIC
Import prices from countries such as China clearly exerted some downward 
pressure on US inﬂ  ation. Although some have argued that US monetary policy 
was too easy between 2002 and 2006, it is difﬁ  cult to argue that US monetary 
policy alone was behind the large movement in relative prices. The United States, 
during this period, was increasing its imports from China, to the point where 
China was close to becoming the largest source of US imports (Figure 9). This 
was the result of the lower prices of goods imported from China, mainly at the 
expense of imports from Mexico. The resulting downward pressure on inﬂ  ation 
enabled the FRB to keep nominal interest rates reasonably low without risking 
rising inﬂ  ation for prices of goods and services. Conversely, import prices from 
commodity-producing countries were rising rapidly (Figure 10), although some 
of this movement, especially between the middle of 2005 and the middle of 2008, 
could be attributed to the depreciation of the US dollar. The price of imports 
from China began to rise in 2006 following China’s move to revalue its currency 
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Figure 9: Composition of US Goods Imports
Source: Thomson Reuters
Figure 10: United States – Import Prices
December 2003 = 100
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In the remainder of this paper, we apply a sequence of shocks to the multi-sector 
global G-Cubed model to see the extent to which the relative price movements 
that were observed across six different sectors can be replicated. The six sectors 
are: agriculture, mining, energy, durable manufactures, non-durable manufactures 
and services. Although the model contains many economies, we focus on just 
three: the United States, China and Australia. The shocks we consider are 
those to productivity, risk premia and monetary policy. We use these shocks 
to approximate some of the key features of the data, namely the large relative 
price movements and the boom in investment, particularly in China and other 
developing economies.
4. The  Model
G-Cubed is a widely used dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium model 
of the world economy (which can be thought of as a hybrid dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model).2 In the version used in this paper, there are 
15 regions (Table 2), each with six sectors of production. The model produces 
annual results for trajectories running decades into the future.
Table 2: Economies in G-Cubed Model
United States China
Japan India
United Kingdom Other Asia
Germany Latin America
Rest of euro area Other LDC (less developed countries)
Canada Eastern Europe & former Soviet Union
Australia OPEC
Rest of the OECD
Because G-Cubed is an intertemporal model, it is necessary to calculate a baseline, 
or ‘business-as-usual’ solution before the model can be used for policy simulations. 
In order to do so, we begin by making assumptions about the future course of key 
exogenous variables. We take the underlying long-run rate of world population 
growth plus productivity growth to be 1.8 per cent per year, and take the long-run 
real interest rate to be 4 per cent. We also assume that tax rates and the shares of 
government spending devoted to each commodity remain unchanged.
2  Appendix A provides additional details. See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) for a complete 
description. This paper uses version 84O of G-Cubed.11
In the G-Cubed model, projections are made based on a range of input assumptions. 
There are two key inputs into the growth rate of each sector in the model. The ﬁ  rst 
is the economy-wide population projection, which differs by economy according 
to the mid-projections made by the United Nations.3 The second is the sectoral 
productivity growth rate. For the baseline, we follow McKibbin, Pearce and
Stegman (2007), where each energy sector in the United States is assumed to 
have a rate of productivity growth of 0.1 per cent over the next century. Each
non-energy sector has an initial productivity growth rate close to historical 
experience but gradually converging to 1.8 per cent per year in the long run. 
We then assume that each equivalent sector in each of the other economies will 
catch up to the US sector in terms of productivity, closing the gap by 2 per cent 
per year, except for developing countries, which are assumed to close the gap 
by 1 per cent per year. The initial gaps are therefore critical for the subsequent 
sectoral productivity growth rate. We assume that the initial gap between all 
sectors and the US sectors are equal to the gap between aggregate purchasing-
power-parity (PPP) GDP per capita between each economy and the United States. 
We cannot easily use sectoral PPP gap measures because these are difﬁ  cult to 
get in a consistent manner and with a sufﬁ  cient coverage for our purposes. Thus 
the initial benchmark is based on the same gap for each sector as the initial gap 
for the economy as a whole. If we then have evidence that a particular sector is 
likely to be closer to, or further away from, the US sectors than the aggregate 
numbers suggest, we adjust the initial sectoral gaps while attempting to keep the 
aggregate gaps consistent with the GDP per capita gaps.
Given these exogenous inputs for population growth and the growth of 
productivity across sectors, we then solve the model with the other drivers of 
growth, namely capital accumulation and sectoral demand for inputs of energy 
and other materials, which are all endogenously determined. Critical to the nature 
and scale of growth across economies are the assumptions outlined above plus 
the underlying assumptions that: ﬁ  nancial capital ﬂ  ows to where the return is 
highest; physical capital is sector-speciﬁ  c in the short run; labour can ﬂ  ow freely 
across sectors within a country but not between economies; and international 
trade in goods and ﬁ  nancial capital is possible, subject to existing tax structures 
and trade restrictions. Thus the economic growth of any particular economy is 
not completely determined by the exogenous inputs in that country alone, since 
all countries are linked through goods and asset markets.
In the analysis in this paper, we start with a projection of the model from 2002 
onwards assuming steady-state growth in productivity as described above. We 
3 See  <http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp>.12
impose each shock, generate results in terms of deviations from the baseline and 
thereby determine the contribution of each shock to changes in relative prices 
and macroeconomic variables.
4.1 Policy  Responses
The results of this exercise will depend on the monetary and ﬁ  scal reactions. 
We assume that ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits are not changed in these results so as to focus on 
the core shocks without any ﬁ  scal stabilisers; that is, any changes in revenue 
are offset by changes in government spending spread across sectors based on 
historical spending shares. Of course, alternative assumptions regarding ﬁ  scal 
policy will change the results. The monetary responses have each economy 
following a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor (HMT) rule shown in Equation (1), 
with different weights on inﬂ  ation (π) relative to target (πT), output growth (Δy) 
relative to potential growth (ΔyT) and the change in the exchange rate (Δe) 
relative to target (ΔeT).
   (1)
The assumed parameter values are set out in Table 3. Note that China and most 
developing economies have a non-zero weight on the change in their exchange 
rate relative to the US dollar.
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Table 3: Coefﬁ  cients in Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor Rules
in Each Economy






United States 0.5 0.5 0
Japan 0.5 0.5 0
United Kingdom 0.5 0.5 0
Germany(a) 0.5 0.5 0
Rest of euro area(a) 0.5 0.5 0
Canada 0.5 0.5 0
Australia 0.5 0.5 0
Rest of the OECD 0.5 0.5 0
China 0.0 0.0 –10 000
India 0.5 0.5 –10
Other Asia 0.5 0.5 –1
Latin America 0.5 0.5 –1
Other LDC 0.5 0.5 –1
Eastern Europe & 
former Soviet Union 0.5 0.5 –1
OPEC 0.5 0.5 –10
(a)  Germany and the rest of the euro area have a ﬁ  xed exchange rate with each other with a common 
interest rate, inﬂ  ation target and output growth target.
5. The  Shocks
A number of shocks to the model are considered and although the focus is on 
producing multipliers for the effect of each shock on inﬂ  ation and relative price 
changes, the shocks are scaled in such as way as to be plausible and to give a 
crude indication of how much of the observed changes in relative prices from 
2002 might be explained within the model. 
We ﬁ  rst consider a surge in productivity growth in both durable and non-durable 
manufacturing sectors in developing economies, particularly China. The assumption 
is that TFP growth in China rises above baseline for a decade before returning 
to baseline (that is, closing the now smaller gap with the United States at 2 per 
cent per year). The actual shocks are shown in Table 4; the other economies are 
scaled to the Chinese shocks as shown. We also set growth in energy, mining 14
and agriculture productivity to zero so that supply shortages emerge gradually 
over time.
The second shock is a fall in global risk, most notable for China, in the form of 
a reduction in equity risk premium in each sector. This leads to an investment 
boom in China and some other economies. The scale of the changes to risk premia 
are also shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Assumptions
Productivity growth rate
  Energy (all countries) 0 forever (1.8% below trend)
  Mining (all countries) 0 forever (1.8% below trend)
  Agriculture (all countries) 0 forever (1.8% below trend)
  Services (all countries) Trend
  Durable manufactures (LATC)(a)
    China 12% above trend for 9 years
    India 6% above trend for 9 years
    Other Asia 6% above trend for 9 years
    Latin America 6% above trend for 9 years
  Non-durable manufactures (LATC)(a)
    China 12% above trend for 9 years
    India 6% above trend for 9 years
    Other Asia 6% above trend for 9 years
    Latin America 6% above trend for 9 years
Risk premia shock
  China (all sectors) –10% forever
  All other countries and sectors –5% forever
(a)  LATC = labour-augmenting technical change
The third shock is to monetary policy over a number of years, with interest rates 
kept lower than otherwise. The logic for this is as follows. The Taylor rule (also 
known in the literature in a more general form as the HMT rule) is often used 
as a guide to measure the level of the short-term nominal interest rate. Between 
2001 and 2006, the federal funds rate was below the rate implied by a widely 
used parameterisation of the Taylor rule by a signiﬁ  cant margin (see Taylor 1993,15
2009).4 Using the core PCE measure of inﬂ  ation, between June 2001 and 
January 2006, the federal funds rate was below the standard Taylor rule 
recommendation by an average of around 125 basis points (Figure 11). By this 
metric, monetary policy was very accommodative during this period. There are 
a number of ways of trying to engineer a path of interest rates that is below that 
recommended by some stylised rule. We could use additive shocks to generate 
a path for interest rates that deviates from the rule. Another way of generating 
this deviation is to argue that the FRB had assumed a higher growth rate for 
potential output, thereby lowering their estimation of the output gap leading to 
lower interest rate settings. Whatever the justiﬁ  cation, the key point is that the 
shocks imply an interest rate path in line with those actually implemented by the 
FRB from 2001 to 2006.
Figure 11: Federal Funds Rate and the Taylor Rule
Sources: Bloomberg; authors’ calculations
The size of the shocks we incorporate seem reasonably plausible in light of actual 
developments over the past seven years or so. The key question then is whether, 
when combined in the model, they are sufﬁ  cient to explain the movements of 
inﬂ  ation and relative prices over this period. To the extent that the shocks might 
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not be sufﬁ  cient, other shocks may need to be incorporated into a further analysis, 
and/or the model may need to be modiﬁ  ed in some way.
6. Results
The results of each shock are shown in Figures 12 through 17. These ﬁ  gures 
display the deviations from the baseline of key variables. Figures 12 and 13 
contain results for China, Figures 14 and 15 for the United States, and Figures 16 
and 17 for Australia. The ﬁ  gures show the response to each of the three shocks 
(separately and combined) of: GDP; investment; the real interest rate; and inﬂ  ation. 
The responses of prices for each of the six sectors in each economy (relative to 
the output price index of each economy) are also shown for the combination of 
the three shocks.
To understand the results it is important to note a key feature of the G-Cubed 
model. A good produced in a sector within a country is an imperfect substitute 
for the same good produced in the same sector in another country. Thus, although 
there are six sectors of production in each country, and each sector within each 
country has a similar name, in effect there are actually 90 different goods in the 
model (6 sectors times 15 economies). Every sector has the same production 
function in each economy, with the same elasticity of substitution between the 
factors of production. The initial input share coefﬁ  cients are from recent input-
output tables for each economy and differ across sectors and across economies.5 
Thus mining in China is initially relatively labour intensive whereas mining in 
Australia is relatively capital intensive.6 Since the production technologies to 
produce investment goods, and goods and services consumed by governments 
and households have ﬁ  nite elasticities of substitution, there is never complete 
convergence in the production technologies of the sectors across economies.
6.1 Productivity  Shocks
First consider the effect of productivity shocks. The rise in manufacturing 
productivity in developing economies raises investment in the manufacturing 
sectors in those economies. The lack of growth in energy, mining and agriculture 
productivity worldwide tends to retard investment in those sectors. In China, 
the rise in productivity raises GDP growth and the level of GDP rises further
5  We use the GTAP 6 Data Base as detailed in Dimaranan (2006).
6  The relative intensities can change as relative prices adjust to shocks. So, for example, if the 
wage-rental ratio increases in China, mining may become more capital intensive there.17
above the baseline each year (Figure 12). Note that the results for GDP in each 
ﬁ  gure are shown as percentage deviations from the baseline in levels, while the 
productivity shock is to the growth rate of productivity. Higher productivity growth 
in manufacturing offsets the low productivity growth in non-manufacturing so 
that aggregate investment rises and  the capital stock grows to the new higher 
level. Because the shock to the growth rate eventually disappears, the level of 
GDP and capital will remain permanently higher. Higher expected incomes in 
China raise consumption. Together with higher investment, aggregate demand 
temporarily rises above aggregate supply and inﬂ  ation temporarily rises even 
though it falls over time. This latter effect follows because the higher growth in 
China implies that the real exchange rate needs to depreciate (since China has 
to sell more goods to the rest of the world). Since the nominal exchange rate is 
ﬁ  xed, this real depreciation occurs via lower inﬂ  ation in China (helped about by 
higher real interest rates).
Figure 12: China – Deviations from the Baseline
Source: authors’ calculations
The top-left panel of Figure 13 shows the relative price impacts of the shock to 
productivity for China. The sectors in which there is strong productivity growth 
(durable and non-durable manufactures) experience falling input costs and lower 
prices relative to the economy average. Sectors that are not growing quickly 
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Years after initial shock18
production but also for higher investment and consumption. Thus the relative prices 
of these sectors tend to rise as their output becomes increasingly scarce relative 
to that of the manufacturing sectors. The demand for services also increases as 
this is a major input into production and consumption. By year 7 the price of 
energy is 16 per cent higher than the price of non-durable manufactures.
There is an additional important effect on durable versus non-durable goods. A rise 
in real interest rates tends to reduce the demand for output of the sectors that are 
producing inputs into capital goods or for goods whose demand depends on the 
calculation of the present value of a ﬂ  ow of future services. This is particularly 
an issue for the durable goods sector since it is a large input into producing the 
investment good that is purchased by all sectors. At the same time, sectors that 
are relatively capital intensive experience a larger increase in the rental cost of 
capital and therefore will contract relative to labour-intensive sectors when the 
real interest rate rises relative to the real wage. In China, the durable goods and 
energy sectors are capital intensive. Mining is relatively labour intensive in China 
but relatively capital intensive in the United States and Australia. 
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Years after initial shock19
The macroeconomic implications of the rise in developing country productivity 
for the United States are shown in Figure 14. US GDP rises as a result of the shock 
in the developing economies, with consumption rising due to higher income from 
investments in developing economies. However, the GDP increase is short-lived 
as capital ﬂ  ows from the United States into developing economies in response 
to higher returns to manufacturing in those economies and due to higher energy 
and mining prices in the world. The hollowing-out of US manufacturing implies 
that GDP is 2.5 per cent below baseline by year 7 even though the growth rate 
of US GDP has returned to its long-run steady state.7 The restructuring of US 
manufacturing also drives the response of aggregate investment (panel 4, Figure 14). 
While there is additional investment in non-energy sectors, this is outweighed by 
the decline of manufacturing. The outﬂ  ow of capital from the United States to 
developing econommies increases real interest rates in the United States, which 
further acts to reduce US investment. As for inﬂ  ation, the initial strength of 
consumption in the United States, together with higher non-manufacturing prices, 
is sufﬁ  cient to initially offset the lower price of imported manufactured goods. 
However by year 4, the productivity shock is deﬂ  ationary for the United States.
Figure 14: United States – Deviations from the Baseline
Source: authors’ calculations
7  While GDP in the United States falls below baseline, the United States receives higher 
income from investments abroad and faces lower prices for imports and other goods. So 
even though production in the United States is below baseline, real incomes are higher and 
























































































































Years after initial shock
—  Global productivity shock     —  Global risk shock
—  US monetary shock     —  All shocks20
The outcomes for relative prices in the United States are shown in the top left 
panel of Figure 15. The pattern is very similar to that in China, with the relative 
price of energy, mining and agriculture rising relative to manufacturing. Despite 
the manufacturing productivity shock occurring outside the United States, the 
fall in the relative price of manufactured goods by year 7 in the United States 
is larger than in China (22 versus 16 per cent respectively).8 The one difference 
between the United States and China, apart from the scale of the response, is that 
the price of services rises in China whereas it is ﬂ  at in the United States. This 
is because there is a larger rise in consumption and, particularly, investment in 
China, which raises the demand for services by more than in the United States.
Figure 15: United States – Relative Prices Deviations from the Baseline
Percentage deviation
Source: authors’ calculations
8  Demand for manufactured goods is relatively weaker in the United States, given that Chinese 
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Years after initial shock21
The responses in Australia to the productivity shocks are shown in Figure 16 and 
the top left panel of Figure 17. The results for GDP are similar to the United States 
in the short run. However, over time the assumption of no productivity growth 
in the relatively large sectors of the Australia economy – energy, mining and 
agriculture – weigh heavily on the growth of overall GDP. The increase in the 
real interest rate also reﬂ  ects the ﬂ  ow of capital out of Australia into developing 
economies’ manufacturing sectors, but this effect is smaller than for the United 
States because there is an inﬂ  ow of investment into mining for export to the rapidly 
growing developing economies, which are demanding more raw materials.

























































































































Years after initial shock
—  Global productivity shock     —  Global risk shock
—  US monetary shock     —  All shocks22
Figure 17: Australia – Relative Prices Deviations from the Baseline
Percentage deviation
Source: authors’ calculations
6.2  Global Risk Shocks
The reduction in global risk (larger in China than everywhere else) takes the form 
of a fall in the equity risk premium. The adjustment mechanism in the model occurs 
through a rise in Tobin’s Q for investment in each sector. This causes an investment 
boom in all countries, especially in China where the shock is largest. As can be 
seen from the macroeconomic results for China (Figure 12), the United States
(Figure 14) and Australia (Figure 16), the adjustment across economies is very 
similar and as expected. Strong investment raises GDP via short-run demand effects. 
Over the medium term, GDP rises with the level of potential output, in line with 
higher capital accumulation. However, there are some subtle differences across 
countries. In China, monetary policy targets the exchange rate. Whereas real interest 
rates rise in the United States and Australia – following the initial shock to demand – 
in China, real interest rates fall initially as otherwise the Chinese currency would 
tend to appreciate (given the larger decline in the equity risk premium there).
The sectoral story for the risk shock is very different to the results for the 
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to ﬁ  rms and households have very different impacts across sectors depending on 
how sectoral output is used and on the capital-labour ratio of each sector. The fall 
in the interest rates faced by households and ﬁ  rms tends to increase the demand 
for capital-intensive goods, inputs into capital-intensive industries and durable 
goods. In all economies, the fall in risk premia causes a rise in the demand for 
durable manufacturing goods and a rise in the relative price of these goods.9 
Note that mining output rises slightly in China because despite being relatively 
labour intensive, it is a large input into durable goods production. In both the
United States and Australia, where mining is relatively capital intensive, there is a 
rise in the relative price. Agriculture prices fall sharply in China because agriculture 
is relatively labour intensive whereas in the United States and Australia, services 
prices fall by most because they are relatively labour intensive. (Agriculture is 
more capital intensive in these economies than in China.)
Another interesting insight from the results is that the initial demand change 
determines the short-run relative price changes in the model. However, over time 
investment and movements of labour across sectors change the supply side of 
some sectors. Thus, the medium-term relative price changes reﬂ  ect a combination 
of demand and supply effects. So although the price of durable goods increases 
most in the short run in China, this induces greater investment in durable goods, 
which expands the supply of these goods and by year 7, the relative price of 
durables has fallen below the output price index. 
6.3  Monetary Policy Shock
The ﬁ  nal shock we consider is to monetary policy with the FRB setting policy 
rates below those implied by a standard Taylor rule. It is useful to start the analysis 
with the results for the United States shown in Figure 14. The US real interest 
rate is 50 basis points lower than baseline initially, falling to 1 percentage point 
below baseline by year 5. This stimulates investment, which raises real GDP 
above trend for a number of years, but at the same time it pushes up inﬂ  ation by 
2.5 to 3 percentage points. The integral of the difference in real GDP over time is 
zero because the higher real GDP in the ﬁ  rst six years is then followed by GDP 
below base in subsequent years (not shown). 
It is interesting to observe that the change in US monetary policy does change 
relative prices in the short run (Figure 15). The channel of adjustment is through 
9  This effect is particularly important for understanding the consequences of the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis on durable goods production and trade in the context of a large increase in 
risk premia. See McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009).24
the impact of real interest rate changes on the demand for durable goods and 
investment, and depends on the capital intensity of production of different 
sectors (as discussed above). In year 1, inﬂ  ation rises by almost 3 percentage 
points and the price of durable goods relative to non-durable goods rises by
1.7 per cent. As would be expected, this relative price adjustment is largely gone 
by year 5. The persistence partly reﬂ  ects the investment changes which propagate 
a supply response well after the demand response has passed. Thus relative 
prices overshoot in subsequent years due to the capital accumulation dynamics. 
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, the results for China are very similar 
to the results for the United States – given that China pegs its currency to the US 
dollar. Thus the real interest rate falls in China as US monetary policy is relaxed 
in order to hold the exchange rate ﬁ  xed. It is difﬁ  cult to see in Figure 12 because 
of the scale of the other shocks, but Chinese inﬂ  ation rises by 3.5 per cent by 
year 3 as China imports the easier US monetary policy. Chinese real GDP is
1.3 per cent higher by year 2 due to the monetary expansion. Although not as 
large as the results for the productivity shocks in China, this effect is nonetheless 
signiﬁ  cant. The dispersion of relative price changes in China is also similar to 
that for the United States and for the same reasons. The one difference again is 
the mining sector, which is relatively labour intensive in China and therefore 
does not receive as much stimulus as in the United States where it is relatively 
capital intensive. 
From the results in Figure 16 and 17, it is clear that the ﬂ  oating exchange rate 
largely insulates the Australian economy from the change in US monetary policy. 
Real interest rates fall but the effect is small. Nonetheless there are changes in 
relative prices because of a minor capital intensity effect in Australia, which 
is due in part to the small change in Australian real interest rates, but more 
importantly because the United States and China are a large share of the global 
economy. The dispersion in US relative prices of 1.8 percentage points and in 
China of 2.7 percentage points is reﬂ  ected in the dispersion in relative prices 
in Australia of 0.8 percentage points. The ﬂ  exible exchange rate only offsets 
aggregate price relativities but has little inﬂ  uence on the relative price differences 
across sectors.
6.4  Combining the Shocks
Each of the ﬁ  gures also contains the results of combining all of the shocks in order 
to get a rough sense of how they offset or reinforce each other. Several interesting 
insights emerge when compared to the actual experience since 2001. First, while 
the developing economy productivity shocks are deﬂ  ationary, this effect is offset 25
by the change in US monetary policy so inﬂ  ation is largely unchanged in the 
United States. Hence, from this perspective, US monetary policy appears to have 
been successful given the announced concern at the time regarding the potential 
for US deﬂ  ation after the dot-com bubble burst in 2001. 
Second, although the relative prices of energy, mining and agriculture after seven 
years move in the same direction as that experienced in the world economy 
over the period 2002 to 2007, the magnitudes are far smaller than the actual 
experience. The extraordinary magnitudes of the relative price changes between 
2005 and 2007 observed in the global economy are not captured by the shocks to 
fundamentals considered in this modelling exercise. The sharp rise in the relative 
prices of commodities in excess of the model simulations could be explained 
by three different causes: speculative activities not built into the analysis in this 
paper; a set of shocks not considered in this paper; or misspeciﬁ  cation of the 
model (that is, the model may not adequately reﬂ  ect reality).
7.  Relative Prices and the Role of Policy
Although monetary policy may have had only a minor role in driving the trends 
in relative prices over the past decade, our simulations show that it is possible for 
monetary policy to have an effect on relative prices in the short to medium term. 
It is also possible that the decline in global risk premia up to 2007 as investors 
searched for yield was also driven, at least in part, by monetary policies globally, 
even though we assume it to be a separate shock in this paper. Although we do 
not formally explore the optimal policy responses to the shocks driving the large 
relative price movements that the world economy has experienced, it is worth 
discussing some of the principles that macroeconomic policies should follow in 
response to these forces.
The presence of nominal rigidities, affecting some wages and/or prices, and real 
rigidities, such as capital adjustment costs, make it possible for monetary policy to 
have some effect on relative prices, including the terms of trade and real exchange 
rates. In an economy with sticky wages or prices, an easing of monetary policy 
will result in prices that are more ﬂ  exible rising faster than those that are more 
sticky. This leads to a temporary shift in demand towards the sticky-price sectors. 
As sticky prices gradually adjust, relative prices and output will eventually return 
to long-run equilibrium. In the meantime, given a temporary fall in real interest 
rates, demand for durable goods, for example, should expand faster than in other 
sectors. Accordingly, the prices of capital-intensive sectors should rise by more 
while real interest rates are low.26
When and how monetary policy should respond to relative price movements 
will depend on the nature of the shocks driving these changes. If they are very 
temporary, there may be little if any time to respond given the lag with which 
monetary policy can take effect. If the shocks are more persistent (though still 
temporary), much of the literature would argue that there are circumstances under 
which it is optimal for policy-makers to essentially do nothing – that is, not to 
respond to the shocks driving relative prices and to tolerate the resulting deviation 
of inﬂ  ation from a target for a short time so long as this does not jeopardise hitting 
the inﬂ  ation target over the medium term. There are circumstances, however, 
when policy may want to actively respond so as to speed the transition to the 
new relative price equilibrium; along the way inﬂ  ation may well deviate from 
target, so again, the monetary authorities will need to ensure that inﬂ  ation remains 
anchored to the target over the medium term. Of course, in practice it is difﬁ  cult 
for policy-makers to recognise in real time whether a shift in relative prices is 
being driven by temporary or permanent factors, nor can they be certain about the 
extent to which policy can successfully ﬁ  ne-tune a faster transition if required. 
Aoki (2001) examines the optimal monetary policy responses to relative price 
changes in both a closed economy model and a small open economy model and 
draws similar conclusions to those presented here. The models are based around 
two sectors, one with ﬂ  exible prices, the other with sticky prices. The main 
ﬁ  ndings are that stabilising relative prices around their efﬁ  cient level should be 
a goal of a central bank and that targeting inﬂ  ation in the sticky-price sector is 
sufﬁ  cient to achieve this goal. In an open economy context, Aoki argues that the 
central bank should target domestic inﬂ  ation since imported prices are typically 
ﬂ  exible. By targeting domestic inﬂ  ation, the central bank can effectively keep 
the real exchange rate at its optimal level, which is desirable from a welfare 
perspective. The argument that central banks should try to stabilise relative prices 
around their efﬁ  cient levels could be extended to a world with other distortions 
not resulting from nominal rigidities.
Benigno (2002) examines optimal policy in an open economy, sticky-price model. 
In a closed economy model, optimal monetary policy tends to be somewhat 
expansionary in order to offset the distortion implied by monopolistic competition. 
In an open economy setting, if monetary authorities behave non-cooperatively, 
there is another mechanism that works in the opposite direction. Each policy-maker 
aims to improve their terms of trade and to shift the burden of production to the 
other country by appreciating their currency in the presence of nominal rigidities. 
The incentive for such contractionary policy is greater the more open an economy 
and the more substitutable domestic and foreign goods are in consumption. 
Others, like Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), ﬁ  nd a similar contractionary bias 27
but for a different reason. In their one-shot, two-country game, tighter monetary 
policy in one country leads to a real depreciation and higher inﬂ  ation for the 
other country. Hence, following a common shock that raises inﬂ  ation in both 
economies, monetary authorities in both countries try to engineer a real exchange 
rate appreciation by tightening monetary policy. The result of this combined 
action by the two policy authorities in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is 
that monetary policy becomes excessively tight in both economies compared to 
an equilibrium when the policy actions in the two countries are coordinated.
While monetary policy can only have relatively temporary effects on relative 
prices10, ﬁ  scal policy can have more enduring effects. The use of ﬁ  scal instruments 
to address permanent changes in relative prices, however, is not without its 
problems and policy-makers need to take some care when using spending and 
taxing instruments to effect a change in relative prices. Should the shift in relative 
prices be the result of reduced competition in a particular market, or distortions 
due to ﬁ  scal policies abroad, there may be a case for a government to levy taxes or 
provide subsidies to offset the effect of these other distortions on relative prices. 
However, if relative prices are changing due to more fundamental factors, such 
as a shift in relative productivity levels, a ﬁ  scal authority working to offset the 
resulting shift in relative prices will lower welfare by distorting the allocation 
of resources.
There are other questions related to how a ﬁ  scal authority should deal with the 
boom in revenues that may result from a large terms of trade boost. Countries 
whose industries are highly concentrated in the production of a few commodities 
that may experience large increases in their prices will need to manage revenues 
carefully. Should the price of a particular commodity rise temporarily, it would 
be prudent of ﬁ  scal authorities to invest the windfall in another economy. This 
way, the ﬁ  scal authority, whose revenues may already be sensitive to the domestic 
economic cycle, can diversify its revenue risk; should commodity prices fall, 
along with the economy’s real and nominal exchange rates, the domestic currency 
value of the government’s investments overseas will rise as a result. Examples 
of this type of fund, known as sovereign wealth funds, include Chile’s Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund and Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global 
(a continuation of the Petroleum Fund). Ideally, these funds would be invested 
in sectors not related to the sources of the shifts in the price of the commodity 
in question.
10 Although monetary policy can have a more sustained (but not permanent) effect if it has 
some effect on the appetite for risk of investors.28
8. Conclusions
This paper considers a stylised representation of three major shocks affecting the 
global economy during the period from 2002 to 2008. These shocks were: a large 
rise in the productivity growth of manufactures relative to non-manufacturing 
sectors in developing economies; a fall in global risk premia; and the relatively 
easy monetary policy stance of the FRB starting after the bursting of the dot-
com bubble in 2001 and lasting up until the early part of 2006. The three shocks 
are considered in a global model that captures the interdependencies between 
economies at both the macroeconomic and sectoral levels.
There are a number of insights that suggest a need for further empirical analysis. 
The ﬁ  rst is that the shift in relative prices observed since 2002 can be partly 
explained by the adjustment in the model in response to the assumed shocks, 
however, the scale of the actual rise in the prices of energy, mining and agriculture 
relative to manufacturing since 2004 are not well captured. Other factors outside 
the fundamentals in the model are needed to explain the scale of this more recent 
experience. The second insight is that the model suggests that there was some 
contribution to global inﬂ  ation due to the FRB keeping interest rates low after 
the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, and that this effect was reinforced 
by the fact that the Chinese and other monetary authorities pegged to the US 
dollar. However, the effect on global relative prices of US monetary policy is 
relatively small compared to the productivity shocks in developing economies. 
One interpretation of these results is that the short-term deﬂ  ationary impact of 
developing economy productivity growth on the US economy was to a large 
extent neutralised in the United States by the change in FRB policy as modelled 
in this paper.
An interesting conclusion of the simulations in this paper is that monetary policy 
tends to affect relative prices for up to four years because the effect of a temporary 
change in real interest rates varies across sectors. The effect depends on each 
sector’s relative capital intensity as well as on the change in the demand for the 
output of each sector as consumption and investment adjust. Eventually the effect 
of monetary policy on relative prices dissipates.
Interestingly, a country that pegs to the US dollar when the United States relaxes 
monetary policy inherits both the overall inﬂ  ationary consequences of the US 
policy shift as well as the dispersion in relative prices, although this partly 
depends on the relative capital intensity of the sectors in the pegging economy. 
A country, such as Australia, which maintains a ﬂ  exible exchange rate is largely 29
shielded from the inﬂ  ationary effect of changes in US monetary policy (via an 
appreciation of the exchange rate) but it is not shielded from the relative price 
effects. These are transmitted through global trade channels and are even larger 
when a signiﬁ  cant part of the world economy pegs to the US dollar and experiences 
similar inﬂ  ationary and relative price movements. 
Finally, it is important to note that there are many caveats surrounding the 
methodology adopted in this paper. It is not meant to be a deﬁ  nitive empirical 
assessment of the role of various shocks in the world economy between 2002 
and 2008. Rather, it is meant to give some insights into the relationships between 
relative prices and overall inﬂ  ation in a world characterised by a variety of 
different shocks.30
Appendix A: The G-Cubed Model
The G-Cubed model is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the world 
economy. The theoretical structure is outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998).11 
A number of studies – summarised in McKibbin and Vines (2000) – show that 
the G-Cubed modelling approach has been useful in assessing a range of issues 
across a number of countries since the mid 1980s.12 Some of the principal features 
of the model are as follows:
• The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimisation by the agents 
(consumers and ﬁ  rms) in each economy. In contrast to static computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models, time and dynamics are of fundamental 
importance in the G-Cubed model. The MSG-Cubed model is known as a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in the macroeconomics 
literature and a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium (DIGE) model in 
the CGE literature.
• In order to track the macroeconomic time series, the behaviour of agents is 
modiﬁ  ed to allow for short-run deviations from optimal behaviour either due to 
myopia or to restrictions on the ability of households and ﬁ  rms to borrow at the 
risk-free rate on government debt. For both households and ﬁ  rms, deviations 
from intertemporal optimising behaviour take the form of rules of thumb, which 
are consistent with an optimising agent that does not update predictions based 
on new information about future events. These rules of thumb are chosen to 
generate the same steady-state behaviour as optimising agents so that in the long 
run there is only a single intertemporal optimising equilibrium of the model. 
In the short run, actual behaviour is assumed to be a weighted average of the 
optimising and rule-of-thumb assumptions. Thus aggregate consumption is a 
weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current asset valuation and 
expected future after-tax labour income) and consumption based on current 
disposable income. Similarly, aggregate investment is a weighted average 
of investment based on Tobin’s Q (a market valuation of the expected future 
change in the marginal product of capital relative to the cost) and investment 
based on a backward-looking version of Q.
11 Full details of the model can be obtained by contacting the authors. 
12 These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s; German uniﬁ  cation in the early 1990s; 
ﬁ  scal consolidation in Europe in the mid 1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the Asian crisis; 
and the productivity boom in the United States.31
• There is an explicit treatment of the holding of ﬁ  nancial assets, including money. 
Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that households require 
money to purchase goods. 
• The model also allows for short-run nominal wage rigidity (by different 
degrees in different economies) and therefore allows for signiﬁ  cant periods of 
unemployment depending on the labour market institutions in each economy. 
This assumption, when taken together with the explicit role for money, is what 
gives the model its ‘macroeconomic’ characteristics. (Here again the model’s 
assumptions differ from the standard market-clearing assumption in most CGE 
models.)
• The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors 
and within countries and the ﬂ  exibility of ﬁ  nancial capital, which immediately 
ﬂ  ows to where expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads 
to a critical difference between the quantity of physical capital that is available 
at any time to produce goods and services, and the valuation of that capital as 
a result of decisions about the allocation of ﬁ  nancial capital.
As a result of this structure, the G-Cubed model contains rich dynamic behaviour, 
driven on the one hand by asset accumulation and, on the other, by wage 
adjustment to a neoclassical steady state. It embodies a wide range of assumptions 
about individual behaviour and empirical regularities in a general equilibrium 
framework. The interdependencies are dealt with by using a computer algorithm 
that solves for the rational expectations equilibrium of the global economy. It is 
important to stress that the term ‘general equilibrium’ is used to signify that as 
many interactions as possible are captured, not that all economies are in a full 
market-clearing equilibrium at each point in time. Although it is assumed that 
market forces eventually drive the world economy to neoclassical steady-state 
growth equilibrium, unemployment does emerge for long periods due to wage 
stickiness, to an extent that differs between economies due to differences in 
labour market institutions.32
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